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ABSTRACT 
There is currently much debate about whether the precise role of the hippocampus in scene 
processing is predominantly constructive, perceptual or mnemonic.  Here, we developed a 
novel experimental paradigm designed to control for general perceptual and mnemonic 
demands, thus enabling us to specifically vary the requirement for constructive processing. 
We tested the ability of patients with selective bilateral hippocampal damage and matched 
control participants to detect either semantic (e.g., an elephant with butterflies for ears) or 
constructive (e.g., an endless staircase) violations in realistic images of scenes. Thus, scenes 
could be semantically or constructively ‘possible’ or ‘impossible’. Importantly, general 
perceptual and memory requirements were similar for both types of scene. We found that the 
patients performed comparably to control participants when deciding whether scenes were 
semantically possible or impossible, but were selectively impaired at judging if scenes were 
constructively possible or impossible.  Post-task debriefing indicated that control participants 
constructed flexible mental representations of the scenes in order to make constructive 
judgements, whereas the patients were more constrained and typically focused on specific 
fragments of the scenes, with little indication of having constructed internal scene models. 
These results suggest that one contribution the hippocampus makes to scene processing is to 
construct internal representations of spatially coherent scenes, which may be vital for 
modelling the world during both perception and memory recall.     
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INTRODUCTION 
If we close our eyes, we can readily construct vivid scenes in our mind’s eye that are spatially 
coherent and richly detailed in semantic content. Such scenes feature prominently when we 
recall past experiences, imagine fictitious or future events, and even when we plan routes 
during navigation. Bilateral lesions to the hippocampi in humans impair all of these abilities 
(Hassabis et al., 2007; Maguire et al., 2006; Mullally et al., 2012; Scoville and Milner, 1957). 
Interestingly, even the capacity to discriminate between visual scenes that are in plain sight 
seems to be compromised in these patients (Aly et al., 2013; Lee et al., 2005a; Lee et al., 
2005b), suggesting that scene perception may also require the hippocampus (see also 
Mullally et al., 2012; Zeidman and Maguire, 2016). This constellation of findings has been 
interpreted in different ways (Aly et al., 2013; Hassabis and Maguire, 2007; Kim et al., 2011; 
Lee et al., 2005a; Lee et al., 2005b; Maguire and Mullally, 2013; Shrager et al., 2006; 
Zeidman and Maguire, 2016). Consequently, there are different views about the precise role 
played by the hippocampus in scene processing.   
One account posits that a primary function of the hippocampus is to construct internal 
models of the world in the form of spatially-coherent scenes (Hassabis and Maguire, 2007; 
Maguire and Mullally, 2013; Zeidman and Maguire, 2016). This scene construction system 
can be driven ‘offline’ during imagination and memory recall, while also continually 
constructing and refining a representation of the scene currently being experienced ‘online’ 
during perception (Aly et al., 2013; Mullally et al., 2012). A consequent prediction of this 
account is that hippocampal-damaged patients should be impaired at selecting a target scene 
from among distractor images of a different scene that are shown from slightly different 
angles.  This is because making such a discrimination judgement necessitates the internal 
modelling of the scenes in order to arbitrate between the given options. Patients do indeed 
show this scene discrimination deficit (Lee et al., 2005a; Lee et al., 2005b). Overall, 
Page 3 of 34
John Wiley & Sons
Hippocampus
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
4 
 
therefore, according to the scene construction account of the hippocampus, whenever 
modelling of a scene is necessary or advantageous – anywhere across cognition, and this 
includes functions such as perception, decision-making, as well as memory and navigation – 
the hippocampal scene construction process will be engaged and deficits will be apparent in 
hippocampal-damaged patients (Mullally and Maguire, 2014; Zeidman and Maguire, 2016). 
Undoubtedly, however, patients with bilateral hippocampal damage do not display 
frank perceptual problems, and the most striking feature of their neuropsychological profile is 
an episodic long-term memory deficit (Penfield and Milner, 1958; Scoville and Milner, 
1957). Another account of the hippocampus therefore argues that its role is fundamentally 
mnemonic (Squire, 1992). According to this view, the scene discrimination deficits described 
above are interpreted not as a scene perception impairment but due instead to the behavioural  
tasks' exceeding the limited capacity of short-term memory, thereby engaging long-term 
memory. Hence, the patients, with their long-term memory deficit, are unable to hold the 
information relating to one scene in memory in order to compare it to other scenes in a 
stimulus array (Kim et al., 2011; Shrager et al., 2006). Moreover, proponents of this view 
have failed to find impaired mental construction of fictitious and future scenes in 
hippocampal-damaged patients (Kim et al., 2015; Squire et al., 2010), although such deficits 
have now been widely reported (reviewed in Clark and Maguire, 2016; Maguire and 
Mullally, 2013) and methodological issues may explain the null findings (Maguire and 
Hassabis, 2011; Maguire et al., 2015).  
Hence, the current debate revolves around the question of whether the hippocampus’ 
contribution to scene processing is constructive, perceptive or mnemonic. In order to 
disambiguate these accounts,, we tested patients with selective bilateral hippocampal damage 
on a new task designed to control for general perceptual, mnemonic and basic task demands, 
meaning that we could isolate the requirement to internally construct spatially coherent 
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representations of scenes. We were inspired by mathematical artists such as Penrose and 
Escher who created images depicting impossible spatial constructions, such as the famous 
endless staircase (Cowan, 1974; Cowan, 1977; Douglas et al., 2016; Kulpa, 1987; Lee and 
Rudebeck, 2010; Penrose and Penrose, 1958; Schacter et al., 1995). Importantly, in our 
experiment, every individual part of a scene was spatially coherent, but holistically the image 
challenged the fundamental spatial construction of real-world scenes (Fig. 1). We reasoned, 
and confirmed in a pilot study, that in order to discriminate between possible and impossible 
constructive scenes, one has to construct an internal model of an intact scene and then match 
and compare that model to the perceived scene. Thus, by having participants decide whether 
an image was constructively possible or impossible, we were able to probe the scene 
construction process with high specificity. We also included a control condition involving 
semantic possible and impossible scenes - for example, an elephant with butterfly ears, or 
vacuuming a tree (see Fig. 1). We confirmed in our pilot study that the distinction between 
possible and impossible semantic scenes required participants to look at the image, 
understand relationships between the semantic elements of the scene, and make a decision 
about its semantic connotation. Importantly, the spatial constructive aspect of these scenes 
was normal, with only the content violating semantic knowledge of what is possible in the 
real world. Furthermore, since the task involved viewing and making a decision about one 
scene at a time, with the scene always visible to the participant, we eliminated the need to 
compare two or more images as in previous scene discrimination studies and thereby 
excluded demands on long-term memory (Lee et al., 2005a; Lee et al., 2005b). Overall, 
therefore, we reasoned that the general perceptual and mnemonic demands were held 
constant across both constructive and semantic conditions, because all of the stimuli were 
similar images of realistic scenes and participants were asked to make a possible/impossible 
decision after every image.  
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 We hypothesised that if the contribution of the hippocampus to scene processing is 
inherently constructive (Zeidman and Maguire, 2016), then the patients would have difficulty 
processing the spatial-constructive aspects of scenes and consequently would be selectively 
impaired at discriminating between possible and impossible scenes only in the constructive 
condition. An implication of such a result is that scene discrimination and scene construction 
deficits in patients with bilateral hippocampal damage could be driven by a spatial-
constructive rather than a general scene encoding or mnemonic impairment.    
 
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
Participants  
Six patients (all right-handed males, mean age 57.0 (SD 16.9) years, age range 27-70) with 
selective bilateral hippocampal lesions and selective episodic memory impairment took part 
(see Tables 1 and 2 for demographic information and neuropsychological profiles). 
Hippocampal damage resulted in all cases from voltage-gated potassium channel (VGKC)-
complex antibody-mediated limbic encephalitis (LE). In line with previous reports of this 
patient population (Dalmau and Rosenfeld, 2014), manual (blinded) segmentation of the 
hippocampi from high-resolution structural MRI scans confirmed that our patients showed 
volume loss confined to the left (Patients – HC: 2506mm
3
 (mean) +/-394 (standard 
deviation), control participants – CTL: 3173 mm
3
 +/-339, t(15)=3.7,  p=0.002, Cohen's 
d=1.8) and right hippocampus (HC: 2678mm
3
 +/-528, CTL: 3286mm
3
 +/-301, t(15)=3.1, 
p=0.008, Cohen's d=1.4). To rule out gross differences between patients and controls 
elsewhere in the brain, an automated voxel-based-morphometry (VBM, Ashburner 2009) 
analysis was carried out using voxel-by-voxel comparisons on whole brain T1 weighted MRI 
images (for imaging details see Callaghan et al., 2015). There were no  differences in grey 
matter volume between the groups outside of the hippocampus, even at a liberal uncorrected 
Page 6 of 34
John Wiley & Sons
Hippocampus
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
7 
 
p-value of less than 0.001 and cluster threshold of 50 voxels. Neuropsychologically, the 
patients displayed an impairment in immediate and delayed memory recall, and they 
recollected significantly fewer episodic, but not semantic, details on the Autobiographical 
Interview (Levine et al., 2002), as detailed on Table 2.  
 
Twelve healthy control participants also took part (all male, one left-handed, mean age 57.2 
(16.6) years, age range from 25-77). There were no significant differences between patients 
and controls on age, general cognitive ability and a range of neuropsychological tests 
assessing semantic memory, language, perception, executive functions and mood (see Table 
2). In addition to comparing the two groups overall, we ensured that each patient was 
matched closely to two of the control subjects on sex, age, and general cognitive ability. All 
participants gave informed written consent in accordance with the local research ethics 
committees. 
 
Imaging details 
High resolution T2-weighted structural MRI scans of the medial temporal lobes  
Five of the patients and 10 of the control participants underwent structural MR imaging 
limited to a partial volume focused on the temporal lobes using a 3.0-T whole body MR 
scanner (Magnetom TIM Trio, Siemens Healthcare, Erlangen, Germany) operated with a 
radiofrequency (RF) transmit body coil and 32-channel head RF receive coil. These structural 
images were collected using a single-slab 3D T2-weighted turbo spin echo sequence with 
variable flip angles (SPACE, see Mugler, Bao et al. 2000) in combination with parallel 
imaging, to simultaneously achieve a high image resolution of ~500µm, high sampling 
efficiency and short scan time while maintaining a sufficient signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). 
After excitation of a single axial slab the image was read out with the following parameters: 
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resolution=0.52 x 0.52 x 0.5 mm
3
, matrix=384 x 328, partitions=104, partition thickness=0.5 
mm, partition oversampling=15.4%, field of view=200 x 171 mm 2, TE=353 ms, TR=3200 
ms, GRAPPA x 2 in phase-encoding (PE) direction, bandwidth=434 Hz/pixel, echo 
spacing=4.98 ms, turbo factor in PE direction=177, echo train duration=881. K-space 
averaging was employed to boost SNR with 90% resampling (i.e. average factor 1.9) 
weighted to the centre of k-space. For reduction of signal bias due to, for example, spatial 
variation in coil sensitivity profiles, the images were normalized using a prescan, and a weak 
intensity filter was applied as implemented by the scanner’s manufacturer. It took 12 minutes 
to obtain a scan.  
 
High resolution T1-weighted structural MRI scans of the whole brain at 3.0 Tesla  
In addition, five of the patients and 11 of the control participants underwent a whole brain 
structural T1weighted sequence at an isotropic resolution of 800µm (Callaghan et al., 2015) 
which was used for the automated VBM analysis (one control participant could not be 
scanned). These images had a FoV of 256mm head-foot, 224mm anterior-posterior (AP), and 
166mm right-left (RL). This sequence was a spoiled multi-echo 3D fast low angle shot 
(FLASH) acquisition with a flip angle of 21
0
 and a repetition time (TR) of 25 ms. To 
accelerate the data acquisition, partially parallel imaging using the GRAPPA algorithm was 
employed in each phase-encoded direction (AP and RL) with forty reference lines and a 
speed up factor of two. Gradient echoes were acquired with alternating readout polarity at 
eight equidistant echo times ranging from 2.34 to 18.44ms in steps of 2.30ms using a readout 
bandwidth of 488Hz/pixel (Helms and Dechent, 2009). The first six echoes were averaged to 
increase SNR (Helms and Dechent, 2009) producing a T1-weighted image with an effective 
echo time of 8.3 ms. 
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High resolution T1-weighted MRI scan of the whole brain at 7.0 Tesla  
One patient could not be scanned at our Centre due to recent dental implants. We therefore 
used images acquired previously on a 7.0 Tesla MRI scanner - a three-dimensional whole-
brain T1- weighted phase sensitive inversion recovery sequence (Mougin et al., 2015) with 
0.6 × 0.6 × 0.6 mm
3
 resolution with a tailored inversion pulse for magnetization inversion at 
ultrahigh field (Hurley et al., 2010), which provided inherent bias field correction. 
 
Hippocampal segmentation   
To improve the SNR of the anatomical images, two or three T2-weighted high resolution 
scans were acquired for a participant. Images from each participant were co-registered and 
denoised following the Rician noise estimation (Coupe et al., 2010). The denoised images 
were averaged and smoothed with a full-width at half maximum kernel of 2x2x2mm. In each 
case, left and right hippocampi were manually (blindly) segmented and volumes extracted 
using the ITK Snap software version 3.4.0 (Yushkevich et al., 2006).  
    
VBM analysis 
An automated VBM analysis was performed using SPM12 (Statistical Parametric Mapping, 
Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, London, UK). The averaged T1-weighted images 
were segmented into grey and white matter probability maps using the unified segmentation 
approach (Ashburner and Friston, 2005). Inter-subject registration of the tissue classes was 
performed using Dartel, a nonlinear diffeomorphic algorithm (Ashburner, 2007). The 
resulting Dartel template and deformations were used to normalize the tissue probability 
maps to the stereotactic space defined by the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) template. 
For VBM analysis, the normalization procedure included modulating the grey matter tissue 
probability maps by the Jacobian determinants of the deformation field and smoothing with 
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an isotropic Gaussian smoothing kernel of 8 mm full width at half maximum (FWHM). The 
normalised grey matter images from controls and the patients with hippocampal damage were 
contrasted in a voxel-by-voxel manner using a two sample t-test and thresholded at p<0.001 
uncorrected and a cluster extend of 50 voxels.   
 
Stimuli 
The images for the main experiment were closely matched between conditions in their format 
(horizontal: 450 pixels (high) x 600 pixels (wide), vertical: 600 x 450 pixels; on average 10 
vertical images per condition, range from 8 to 12) and whether they were photographs or 
paintings (on average 13.5 paintings per condition, range from 12-14). All images were in 
colour except for two (one semantic possible and one semantic impossible scene). The 
content of the images was carefully matched across semantic and constructive images (e.g., a 
possible and an impossible semantic landscape or a possible and an impossible constructive 
tower). However, we ensured, via pilot testing, that participants were not aware of this.   
 
Task procedure  
Before the main experiment, participants underwent a practice session. They were told that 
they would be viewing pictures of scenes on a computer screen one at a time and that they 
should look very carefully at these pictures because some of the scenes would depict 
something that is not possible. Each condition was explained separately in detail using hard 
copies of example images. In the first instance, semantic and constructive violations were 
pointed out to the participant and great care was taken to ensure that participants understood 
what was meant by these errors. That is, for the semantic violations, the participants were 
instructed to check whether the content of an image looked right to them (e.g., an elephant 
with butterfly ears, flying on clouds, breathing under water). For constructive violations, 
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participants were instructed to check whether the image depicted a spatially implausible 
scene (e.g., wrong perspectives, endless staircases). In addition, various descriptions of the 
term “impossible” (e.g., “not quite right”, “odd”, “highly unlikely”) were incorporated 
throughout the instructions and practice session to ensure that participants understood the 
concept. During the task, participants were presented with one scene image at a time and 
were simply asked to decide whether they thought the current scene depicted something that 
was possible or impossible in the real world and to indicate their response via a key press. 
Participants were not explicitly told whether a picture belonged to the semantic or 
constructive condition. Following each possible/impossible decision, they were asked to rate 
how difficult they found it to decide whether a scene was possible or impossible, and then 
how confident they were in their decision.  
Following these instructions, participants completed a practice session on the 
computer. There were eight images (two per condition) in the practice session. The 
experiment was run using Cogent 2000 version 125 (Wellcome Trust Centre for 
Neuroimaging and Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, UCL, London, UK). Each image was 
presented for three seconds at the centre of the screen before the question “Is this scene 
possible or impossible? 1 – possible, 3 - impossible” appeared underneath it. Participants then 
had up to an additional 15 seconds to look at the scene image and question and indicate their 
decision by pressing either key number 1 (possible) or 3 (impossible). After participants 
responded, the scene image disappeared and the difficulty question and its rating scale (1=not 
at all, 2=somewhat, 3=very) appeared on the screen. Once the difficulty rating was made, the 
confidence question and its rating scale (1=not at all, 2=somewhat, 3=very) appeared on the 
screen. Participants were then prompted to press the space bar to proceed to the next scene 
image. For both difficulty and confidence ratings, participants had a maximum of 15 seconds 
to respond before continuing onto the next trial. During the practice session, the experimenter 
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also provided verbal feedback for each image. If there were any mistakes in assigning an 
image to either possible or impossible, the experimenter would bring up the image on the 
computer screen again after completion of the practice session and explain the difference 
between both categories again for each of the mistakes until the participant comprehended the 
task instructions.  
On completion of the practice session, the participants completed two blocks of the 
main task, each containing 50 images. The images were presented in pseudo random order so 
that no more than two images of the same condition were presented consecutively. The 
timings of the main experiment were identical to the practice session. Completion of the 
practice and main experiment took participants approximately 40 minutes.  
 
Debriefing   
To explore any potential group differences in strategies used during the task, we asked each 
participant the following debriefing questions immediately; i.e., less than a minute after 
completing the task: 
1. How did you do the task? Did you have a strategy for how you made up your mind 
whether a scene was possible or not?  
2. What was your general mind set in the experiment? How did you approach each scene? 
(Here, we aimed to further explore the strategies used.) 
3. Did you know any of the images from before the experiment? (All participants answered 
no to this question.) 
Patients and control participants were able to give detailed and insightful responses to these 
questions. 
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Data analysis  
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests confirmed that the data were normally distributed.  We therefore 
used separate two-way repeated measures analysis of variance (2way-RM-ANOVA) with 
participant group (patients, control participants) as a between subject factor with two levels 
and scene category as a repeated measurement (within subject) factor with four levels 
(possible semantic, impossible semantic, possible constructive and impossible constructive) 
to assess significance levels of hit rate, reaction times and rating responses. Main effects and 
interaction effects were evaluated first, and a two-sided p-value of less than 0.05 was used to 
reject the null hypothesis in each case. Where there were significant main or interaction 
effects, all possible post-hoc comparisons between groups and scene categories were 
conducted using Sidak’s multiple comparison tests, again using a two-sided corrected p-value 
of less than 0.05.  
 Pairwise independent comparisons between both groups (e.g., discrimination scores, 
hippocampal volumes) were conducted using Student’s two sample t-test. Again, a two-sided 
threshold of p less than 0.05 was considered statistically significant. In order to examine 
potential group by stimulus interactions, we conducted Pearson’s correlations on the hit rate 
per stimulus between controls and patients for all scene images, and separately for each scene 
category. A two-sided p-value of less than 0.05 was again considered statistically significant.  
To enhance the interpretability of the results and where appropriate, we also report the 
effect sizes (using Cohen’s d) and show the individual data from each participant.  
 
RESULTS 
Discrimination  
Examining the accuracy of all four scene conditions (semantic possible, semantic impossible, 
constructive possible and constructive impossible), we found a significant main effect of 
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scene category (F(3,48)=7.7, p=0.0003) and an interaction effect between participant group 
(patients/healthy control participants) and scene category (F(3,48)=3.3, p=0.027) whereas the 
main effect of group was not significant (F(1,16)=2.5, p=0.13; see Figure 3a for individual 
performance scores and Table 3 for means and standard deviations for each scene category). 
Patients with hippocampal damage performed at a similar high level of accuracy as the 
control participants when making judgements about the semantic possible (Sidak’s post hoc 
test, t(64)=0.6,  p=0.95, Cohen's d=0.3), semantic impossible (t(64)=0.9,  p=0.85, Cohen's 
d=0.5), and constructive possible (t(64)=1.94, p=0.21, Cohen’s d=1.6) scenes. By contrast, 
patients identified significantly fewer constructive impossible scenes than control participants 
(t(64)=2.7,  p=0.03, Cohen's d=0.9). Moreover, patients categorized significantly fewer 
constructive impossible scenes correctly than they did semantic possible (t(48)=4.1, p=0.022, 
Cohen’s d=1.7) and impossible scenes (t(48)=4.1, p=0.022, Cohen’s d=1.7). No other post 
hoc comparison within the patient or the control group or between groups revealed a 
significant result, indicating that the observed effect was specific to the patients’ 
categorisation of impossible constructive scenes.  
 Making judgements between possible and impossible scenes that are either semantic 
or constructive is essentially asking the same question - in order to know what is impossible, 
one has to know what is possible. Hence, we calculated a discrimination score for each 
participant, defined as the difference between all constructive scenes correctly classified and 
all semantic scenes correctly classified, divided by 50 (the total number of semantic or 
constructive images). A value of zero therefore indicates an equal number of errors for 
semantic and constructive scenes. A negative score indicates more errors for constructive 
scenes (with a minimum of -1) and a positive score indicates more errors for semantic scenes 
(with a maximum of 1). Using this discrimination score, the difference between patients with 
hippocampal damage and controls on this task became very evident (Fig. 3b). In comparison 
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to control participants, patients made significantly more discrimination errors for constructive 
than semantic scenes (Patients: -0.14 (mean) +/-0.07, Controls -0.01 +/-0.05, 2-sided t-test, 
t(16)=4.4, p=0.0005, Cohen’s d=2.1).    
 
Other task parameters  
Reaction times for all scene categories were similar for control participants and patients 
(F(1,16)=0.0008, p=0.978, see Fig. 4 for individual data points and Table 3 for means and 
standard deviations). Following each possible/impossible decision, participants were asked 
about the difficulty of this discrimination. Of note, one participant rated all scenes as 
maximal difficult (response key 3) and maximal confident (response key 3). We therefore 
excluded his difficulty and confidence rating responses from the analysis. None of the 2way-
RM-ANOVAs revealed any significant main or interaction effects. Most important for our 
study, both subject groups rated difficulty as equally low, regardless of whether scenes were 
semantic or constructive, (F(1,15)=3.1, p=0.097).  Moreover, when asked to rate their 
confidence in their possible/impossible decision, both groups expressed high confidence 
across scene categories (F(1,15)=0.05, p=0.82).  
 
Considered with the scene discrimination results, these findings indicate that patients with 
hippocampal damage did not process the constructive scenes as accurately as control 
participants but were generally unaware of this deficit, since they did not rate constructive 
scenes as being more difficult to judge, and retained high confidence in their decisions.  
 
Group by stimulus interactions   
We next considered whether the significant accuracy result was in any way influenced by 
patients responding in a different manner to the stimuli compared to control participants. We 
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conducted correlation analyses between the number of times a scene was correctly identified 
as possible or impossible by patients and controls. That is, if the pattern of responses to the 
scene stimuli was different between the groups (e.g., if patients randomly selected possible 
and impossible), we would expect no correlation of correct responses between the groups. 
However, correct responses, collapsed across scene categories, correlated significantly 
between patients and control participants (100 scene images, Pearson’s r=0.52, R
2
=0.28, 
p<0.0001). This finding indicates that scene images that were classified correctly by control 
participants, were also classified correctly by the patients, and similarly for those stimuli that 
were erroneously classified. When analysed as a separate subgroups, this correlation was also 
significant for the constructive (50 scenes, r=0.58, R
2
=0.33, p<0.0001) and semantic (50 
scenes, r=0.46, R
2
=0.21, p=0.0009) images. Hence, the response profile to individual stimuli 
did not differ between patients and control participants; it was just that the patients were 
significantly poorer at discriminating between possible and impossible constructive scenes.    
 
Qualitative exploration of strategies  
To explore any potential group differences in the strategies that were used to make the 
possible/impossible decision for each category of scene, participants were asked a series of 
open-ended questions immediately after the conclusion of the task.  Interestingly, the 
responses for both semantic and constructive scenes differed considerably between the 
patients and control participants (Fig. 5). 
For the semantic scenes, five of the patients but only three of the control participants 
responded that they knew instantaneously whether an image was right or wrong, that it was a 
quick and constrained process. However, nine control participants, but only one patient 
spontaneously explored the scenes and thought creatively and flexibly about how an 
impossible scene could be made possible. In fact, during the post-task debriefing, controls 
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often vividly described how they would go about trying to construct some of the impossible 
semantic scenes.  
For the constructive scenes, four patients and just one control described focussing 
closely on specific angles and intersection areas.  The patients realised these individual parts 
were pertinent, but this realisation was clearly not sufficient, given their impairment on the 
task. In contrast, eleven control participants, but only two patients, described the 
discrimination process as considering the whole perspective or overall construction of the 
scene.  
Despite the exploratory nature of these responses, it is interesting to note that even 
with similar accuracy performance on semantic scenes, the strategies reported by patients 
with hippocampal damage differed from those of control participants. That is, controls 
seemed to have a coherent, holistic and detailed internal model of both semantic and 
constructive scenes. By contrast, patients with hippocampal damage seemed to operate in a 
more constrained manner, sticking closely to the scene that was in front of their eyes, 
processing it in a fragmented fashion, with little indication of using an internal model of the 
scene. 
 
DISCUSSION 
The current study sought to refine our understanding of hippocampal contributions to scene 
processing. In a novel task, we presented two types of impossibilities in scene images, 
semantic and constructive, that allowed us to hold general perceptual and mnemonic demands 
constant while isolating the need to construct spatially coherent scenes. We reasoned that 
deciding whether a scene is semantically possible or impossible depends on intact scene 
perception and scene comprehension, short-term memory and semantic knowledge. The 
efficient discrimination of constructive possible and impossible scenes additionally depends 
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on the ability to internally construct spatially coherent scenes. We found that patients with 
selective bilateral hippocampal damage had difficulty only in discriminating between 
possible and impossible constructive scenes, but not between possible and impossible 
semantic scenes. These results support the view that the contribution of the hippocampus to 
scene processing may be spatial-constructive (Hassabis and Maguire, 2007; Maguire and 
Mullally, 2013; Zeidman and Maguire, 2016).   
Our findings appear at odds with one study where it was reported that H.M., the 
amnesic patient first studied by Scoville and Milner (Scoville and Milner, 1957), detected 
fewer semantic impossibilities in a version of the children’s game “What’s wrong here?” 
compared with healthy control participants (MacKay and James, 2009). However, the stimuli 
used in that study were drawings of crowded scenes, each containing over ten semantic 
errors, such as a bird swimming in a fishbowl or a non-functional door (Tallarico, 1991). 
Given that H.M.’s brain lesions extended well beyond the boundaries of the hippocampus 
(Annese et al., 2014), it is likely that his impaired semantic error detection was due to 
temporal neocortical damage. Moreover, intact hippocampal-based scene construction would 
presumably be very useful in helping to detect multiple semantic errors in crowded scene 
images.  
Here we focussed specifically on semantic and constructive impossibilities within 
scenes, and our findings accord with a recent fMRI finding of increased hippocampal 
engagement during detection of impossible compared to possible constructive scenes 
(Douglas et al., 2016). By contrast, other studies have examined the neural substrates of 
possible and impossible objects. For example, evidence from an early positron emission 
tomography (PET) study suggested that the medial temporal lobes are involved in detecting 
the spatial coherence of objects (Schacter et al., 1995). However, the spatial resolution of this 
early finding precluded differentiation between different medial temporal lobe structures. We 
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now know that the hippocampus itself is usually not involved in object processing (Barense et 
al., 2012; Hassabis and Maguire, 2009; Lee et al., 2005b; Mullally et al., 2012; Zeidman et 
al., 2014). Indeed, a patient with perirhinal cortex damage was impaired in discriminating 
between possible and impossible objects, whereas a patient with selective hippocampal 
damage performed similarly to healthy control participants (Lee and Rudebeck, 2010). In our 
study, we therefore selected realistic scene stimuli that we expected would require intact 
hippocampal functioning. Supporting the notion that we were indeed tapping scene 
processing, rather than object processing, controls described their strategies for the 
constructive scenes as constructing the entire scene in their imagination, rather than focussing 
on an object within the image. Interestingly, this global scene construction strategy was much 
less evident in the patients, which accords with other work showing that the attempts such 
patients make at scene construction are fragmented (Hassabis et al., 2007) and that they are 
biased towards local features in scenes (Aly et al., 2013). 
Our results also question whether the hippocampus is involved in scene perception per 
se, since the detection of both semantic and constructive errors required intact scene 
perception or more general visual encoding of the scene images. From this perspective, other 
findings of hippocampal involvement in scene perception might also be interpreted as relying 
on the ability to construct a mental model of a scene (Lee et al., 2013; Lee et al., 2005b). That 
is, the tasks typically used to assess scene perception involve discrimination between highly 
similar scenes. In some cases, the scenes are presented from different viewpoints (Lee et al., 
2013). Hence, one has to mentally rotate the scenes in order to compare them and detect the 
odd-one-out. This rotation process requires the mental construction of the scene; a task, we 
would argue, that requires an intact hippocampus.  
Having said that, in healthy individuals scene perception and scene construction are 
probably very closely linked. We automatically model the scene we are currently perceiving 
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(Chadwick et al., 2013; Mullally et al., 2012; Zeidman and Maguire, 2016; Zeidman et al., 
2015). In fact, our control participants stated that they used scene construction processes 
automatically even during the search for semantic errors, despite this being unnecessary to 
achieve high accuracy on the task. Only by directly manipulating these processes and by 
testing patients with selective bilateral hippocampal damage could we start to pinpoint the 
hippocampal contribution to this intricate dialogue between scene perception and 
construction.      
 Another interpretation of the scene discrimination deficits seen in patients with 
hippocampal damage is that these patients are unable to compare two or more realistic scene 
images to each other because this exceeds the capacity of short-term memory (Kim et al., 
2015; Kim et al., 2011; Shrager et al., 2006). However, in our task each trial involved only 
one scene image which was always visible, circumventing the need to compare information 
across images, and therefore greatly minimising the mnemonic load. In addition, whatever 
general memory ability was necessary to perform this task (e.g., remembering the task 
instruction to decide if a scene was possible or impossible) was matched across the semantic 
and constructive conditions. We therefore believe that a purely mnemonic account of the 
selective deficit in detecting constructive impossibilities cannot explain our results.  
A surprising observation from our study was that, despite no significant differences in 
accuracy or reaction times in the semantic scenes condition between control participants and 
patients, the strategies used by the two groups differed considerably. Controls described 
constructing vivid scenarios about how to make some of the impossible semantic scenes 
possible, whereas patients with hippocampal damage were much less likely to describe 
working flexibly with the scene images. It seems as if a functioning hippocampus readily 
engages and constructs internal models of scenes even though these are not always necessary 
for the task at hand. Although speculative, this observation is in line with previous research 
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showing that hippocampal damage inhibits the creative and flexible use of internal 
representations of a wide variety of material (Duff et al., 2013; Rubin et al., 2014) but which, 
we suggest, typically involve creating spatially coherent scenes.        
 In conclusion, here we showed that patients with selective bilateral hippocampal 
damage have a specific difficulty discriminating between possible and impossible 
constructive scenes, indicating that the hippocampus has a particular and necessary role in 
constructing spatially coherent models of scenes regardless of semantic content. These 
findings refine our understanding of hippocampal function, and potentially its involvement in 
the higher order cognitive processes of perception and memory recall.  
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Fig. 1.  Example stimuli. Semantic scenes are presented in the the upper left panel: the 
possible semantic scene depicts a typical landscape, whereas the impossible semantic scene 
shows a woman vacuuming the leaves from a tree, which would not happen in the real world. 
The lower panel depicts examples of constructive scenes. On the left side of the panel, a 
possible constructive scene includes a typical pavilion, whereas an impossible constructive 
scene beneath shows arches that would not be possible to build in the real world. In 
particular, the top connecting structure suggests a flat architecture, the columns of the arches 
are located at different depths within the scene.  
Impossible pictures were adapted from the following sources:  
Semantic: http://www.erikjohanssonphoto.com/;  
http://www.ucreative.com/inspiration/surreal-photography-of-flying-house-by-rafa-zubiria/; 
http://www.gettyimages.co.uk/detail/photo/businessman-swimming-in-sea-of-envelopes-
high-res-stock-photography/200354836-001;  
Constructive: http://www.moillusions.com/funny-lookin-arch-illusion/; 
http://impossible.info/english/art/mey/mey3.html; 
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/38/Perth_Impossible_Triangle.jpg;   
 
Fig. 2. Characterisation of hippocampal damage. Example T2-weighted structural MR image 
of a patient with selective bilateral hippocampal damage (upper panel) and an age, gender 
and IQ-matched healthy control participant (lower panel). Images are displayed in native 
space corresponding approximately to the position of y= -10 in the MNI coordinate system.  
 
Fig. 3.  Task results. A: Percent accuracy for each condition for individual patients with 
hippocampal damage is shown (HC, red symbols, n=6) and healthy control participants 
(CTL, blue circles, n=12). The height of the bars represents the mean. **=p<0.01; 
***=p<0.001. Between-group effects are indicated in black, within group effects are 
indicated in colour (HC in red). Hippocampal damaged patients were selectively impaired in 
detecting constructive impossible scenes.  B: The dissociation between semantic and 
constructive impossibility detection is shown. The discrimination score is defined as the 
difference between correctly classified constructive and correctly classified semantic scenes 
divided by the maximal number of correct answers in a category. A maximum score of 1 
indicates only semantic errors with no misclassified constructive scenes and a minimum score 
of -1 indicates only constructive errors with no misclassified semantic scenes. Controls 
misclassified approximately the same amount of semantic and constructive scenes (hence a 
discrimination score around zero), whereas patients with hippocampal damage made 
significantly more errors on the constructive scenes (and hence have a negative 
discrimination score).     
 
Fig. 4 Reaction times and ratings. A: Reaction times (calculated from the onset of the 
‘possible/impossible’ question) are shown in seconds (bar indicates the mean) for the 
possible/impossible decision of individual patients (HC red symbols) and control participants 
(CTL blue circles). There were no significant differences between conditions or groups. B: 
Difficulty ratings where the bar indicates the mean, 1=very easy…3=very difficult. Note that 
difficulty and confidence rating data from one patient were excluded – see text. There were 
no significant differences between conditions or groups. C. Confidence ratings where the bar 
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indicates the mean, 1=not confident at all…3=very confident. There were no significant 
differences between conditions or groups.  
 
Fig. 5.  Exploration of task-related strategies. A: Examples of the strategies for detecting 
semantic and constructive impossible scenes as described by patients with hippocampal 
damage (HC) and healthy control participants (CTL). B: Strategies expressed as the 
percentage of participants (patients in red and healthy control participants in blue), who used 
the strategy. For semantic scenes, the majority of patients described a constrained and 
abstract focus on the semantic content of an image, whereas the majority of controls 
additionally engaged in manipulation of image content flexibly and creatively in their mind’s 
eye. For constructive scenes, the patients typically focused on specific fragments of an image, 
whereas controls constructed an internal spatially coherent representation of the entire scene.     
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Table 1: Summary of demographic information 
Group N HD Age Chronicity LHC vol* RHC vol* 
HC group 6 (M) 6 (R) 57.0 6.8 2506 2678 
 
16.9 2.1 394 528 
CTL group 12 (M) 11 (R) 57.2 n.a. 3173 3286 
      16.6   339 301 
p-value     0.98 n.a. 0.002 0.008 
 
For both groups, means are displayed with standard deviations underneath. 
HC=hippocampal-damaged patients; CTL=healthy control participants; M=Male; 
HD=Handedness; n.a.=not applicable; R=Right; L=Left; vol=volume in mm
3
. *One 
control participant could not be scanned, therefore HC volumes are based on all six 
patients and 11 control participants. Age and chronicity are described in years. p-
value=p-value of two-sample t-test with significant differences depicted in bold. 
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 Table 2: Summary of neuropsychological profile 
WASI-M WASI-S AMint* AMext* IRM DRM RM SEM WM Lang EF Perc Mood 
HC 13.2 12.8 31.7 6.1 -0.7 -0.7 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.4 0.0 
 
2.2 1.8 6.7 3.8 0.8 0.8 1.1 1.2 0.8 0.9 0.5 1.6 1.0 
  
 CTL 13.8 11.8 51.3 5.9 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0 
  1.5 2.6 13.6 2.2 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.9 1.1 0.9 0.6 0.3 0.8 
p 0.46 0.41 0.01 0.92 0.001 0.01 0.29 0.39 0.42 0.37 0.39 0.22 0.94 
 
For both groups, means are displayed with standard deviations underneath. HC=hippocampal-damaged patients; 
CTL=healthy control participants; p=p-value of two-sample t-test with significant differences (all memory-
related) depicted in bold.  The WASI-M and WASI-S are shown as scaled score means, and the 
Autobiographical Interview scores are shown as standard means for this test. The other scores (where available 
scaled scores) of individual tests have been transformed into z-scores and averaged across patients and controls 
within each neuropsychological domain. Therefore, a mean z-score of zero indicates that both groups had the 
same mean. Domains contained the following subtests: WASI-M=Matrix Reasoning and WASI-S= Similarities 
subtest of the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI; Wechsler, 1999). AM=autobiographical 
memory interview (Levine et al., 2002): int=internal (episodic) details, ext=external (semantic) details. *Of 
note, autobiographical memory performance of the patients was compared to a separate control group (5 males, 
1 female, mean age 55.2+/-18 years, range 22-69, all right-handed). IRM=immediate recall memory: Wechsler 
Memory Scale (WMS-III; Wechsler, 1997), logical memory 1 units and thematic scores, wordlist 1 total recall, 
and Rey-Osterrieth complex figure immediate recall (Osterrieth, 1944). DRM=delayed recall memory: WMS-III 
logical memory 2 units and thematic scores, and Rey-Osterrieth complex figure delayed recall. RM=recognition 
memory: Warrington Recognition Memory Test for words and faces (Warrington, 1984), WMS-III wordlist 2 
recognition. SEM=semantic memory: Warrington Graded Naming Test (McKenna and Warrington, 1980; 
Warrington, 2010). WM=working memory: WMS-III digit span subtest. Lang=language abilities: Delis-Kaplan 
Executive Function System (D-KEFS) letter fluency and category fluency tests (Delis et al., 2001). 
EF=executive functions: D-KEFS category switch test, word-colour interference test, trails test (average of 
visual scanning, number sequencing, letter sequencing, number-letter switching, and motor speed tests), Hayling 
Test Sentence Completion Test (Burgess and Shallice, 1997). Perc=perception: Visual Object and Space 
Perception Battery (VOSP) dot counting, cube analysis, position discrimination tests (Warrington and James, 
1991), and the Rey-Osterrieth Complex Figure copy. Mood=Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS; 
Zigmond and Snaith, 1983). 
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Table 3: Summary of behavioural results on the impossible scenes task 
Group Scene category Accuracy   RT (sec)   Difficulty* Confidence* 
HC Semantic possible 95.3 3.0 4.2 2.1 1.2 0.2 2.8 0.2 
Semantic impossible 95.3 3.9 2.9 1.5 1.1 0.1 2.8 0.1 
 
Constructive possible 86.7 4.8 4.6 1.6 1.3 0.2 2.7 0.2 
Constructive impossible  76.0 15.6 4.0 1.3 1.2 0.2 2.8 0.2 
CTL Semantic possible 92.7 10.1 4.0 2.4 1.3 0.2 2.8 0.2 
Semantic impossible  91.7 9.4 3.4 2.3 1.2 0.3 2.8 0.2 
Constructive possible 94.7 5.2 4.3 3.1 1.5 0.3 2.7 0.2 
Constructive impossible  87.3 6.8 3.9 1.8 1.4 0.2 2.7 0.2 
2way-RM-ANOVA sig.   n.s.   n.s.   n.s.   
 
For both groups, means are displayed with standard deviations in italics to the right. HC=hippocampal-damaged 
patients; CTL=healthy control participants; 2way-RM-ANOVA=2-way-repeated-measures Analysis of 
Variance; sig=significant main effect of scene category and interaction effect (for exact statistics, see main text); 
n.s.=no significant main or interaction effects; Accuracy displayed as percent hit rate; RT=reaction times, 
calculated from the onset of the ‘possible/impossible’ question; sec=seconds; Difficulty and confidence ratings 
ranged from 1 (not at all) to 3 (very); *=one patient rated both difficulty and confidence for every picture at 
level 3, we therefore excluded his ratings.   
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